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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear fission as a method for generating electrical energy is 
a reality of modem American society. The issues surrounding the 
debate over the future of nuclear energy policy in the United 
States are complicated and cannot be reduced to a simple set of 
considerations. There are environmental, economic, social, and cul­
tural costs involved in using any energy source. When viewed 
in a vacuum, these costs will appear unreasonable. Balanced 
against these costs, however, are the societal benefits which the 
use of that energy will yield. The nuclear energy debate has re­
vealed that balancing these considerations is an enormous task. A 
formulation of an intelligent nuclear energy policy will require a 
thorough assessment of the various societal costs associated with 
this energy alternative. 
One major concern is that the use of nuclear fission to gener­
ate electricity produces large quantities of highly toxic and poten­
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tially hazardous nuclear materials. In the wrong hands, these mate­
rials could be fabricated into a crude nuclear weapon or dispersed 
as a powerful toxin. The possible catastrophic consequences which 
could result from the malevolent use of nuclear materials dictates 
that the industry adopt an almost infallible system of security. The 
need to maintain this system of strict security is an important con­
sideration of this energy alternative. The potential curtailment of 
civil liberties that such a security system will entail must be con­
sidered as one of the costs of nuclear energy. History teaches that 
strong domestic security measures often engender violations of in­
dividuals' constitutionally protected rights and liberties. 
The entire spectrum of measures used to control the use of and 
access to nuclear materials is gathered under the rubric of "nuclear 
safeguards." Increased public concern over the spectre ofnuclear ter­
rorism has been spurred by a worldwide increase in politically mo­
tivated violence. This has led to the consideration of various forms 
of intensified nuclear precautionary measures to prevent the theft 
or loss of nuclear materials, or the sabotage of nuclear facilities. 
This article will discuss current and prospective nuclear safeguards 
and evaluate their probable impact on civil liberties. 
Nuclear safeguards touch many different constitutionally pro­
tected rights. The breadth of the problem makes a comprehensive 
constitutional analysis of each issue raised impossible for a short ar­
ticle. Rather than attempt such an analysis, this article seeks only 
to identify some of the potential problem areas, leaving a defini­
tive legal analysis for other, more ambitious works. This article at­
tempts to outline a basic framework within which a meaning­
ful evaluation can occur in the scientific, legal, and political 
communities. 
Many of the issues raised by the controversy over nuclear safe­
guards are related to the overall need for, and desirability of, nu­
clear energy as an alternative to fossil fuels. No attempt will be 
made here to comparatively evaluate alternative energy sources. A 
cursory review of the United States' energy problem will be pre­
sented, however, to establish a background for an analysis of the . 
nuclear safeguards. 
Overall, the energy problem may be the most difficult and 
complex problem faced in the twentieth century. Modem society 
has thrived on an abundantly available energy supply for many 
years. The industrial world has increased its consumption of energy 
as production has increased. The energy needs for production do 
not account for energy resource depletion or dependence on unsta­
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ble supplies. The costs associated with energy have skyrocketed 
during the last seven years due mainly to OPEC's (Oil Producing 
Exporting Countries) price increases. Because our country has as­
sumed that there will be a constant and abundant supply of energy 
for our production needs, we have designed our production to de­
pend on an abundant supply. 
The recognition that fossil fuel energy sources will be ap­
proaching depletion in the near future has forced scientists and 
politicians to earnestly seek alternative sources of energy. The en­
ergy alternative most heavily relied on by the policy-makers in the 
United States has been nuclear energy. Nuclear energy presently 
accounts for over ten percent of the nation's electrical production. 
This figure is expected to rise to over twenty percent by 1985. 
Certain regions in the United States are more dependent upon this 
energy alternative than others; New England, for example, pro­
duces over one third of its electrical energy by nuclear fission. 
Nuclear energy critics have raised many issues about energy 
escalation ranging from the basic environmental and safety consid­
erations to more subtle social and cultural effects of nuclear en­
ergy. This article is limited to an evaluation of how an industry se­
curity system may affect individual civil liberties. A general 
conclusion about the desirability and acceptability of nuclear en­
ergy is not offered. Neither are the relative civil liberities impact of 
other energy alternatives, including possible alternative nuclear re­
act6r fuel cycles, considered. 1 
A. Nuclear Energy Production 
Security threats exist in all four phases of the nuclear energy 
industry: The production and transport of nuclear fuel; the nuclear 
energy generating process itself; the reclamation processes; and the 
storage and eventual disposal of spent fuel. Security problems fall 
into two categories: (1) The fear that nuclear materials will be 
exploited for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons and (2) the pos­
sibility that environmental contamination will occur. The level of 
security required at any facility depends on the type of reactor 
used and the type of nuclear materials present. Only certain nu­
1. There is no reason to believe that alternative nuclear fuel cycles may not of~ 
fer somewhat different security considerations. Some commentators have suggested 
that alternative nuclear fuel cycles may be preferable, from a safeguard standpoint, 
than the plutonium recycle system analyzed here. See Ferveson, Taylor, von Hippel 
& Williams, The Plutonium Economy: Why We Should Wait and Why We Can Wait, 
BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, December 1976, at 10-14. 
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clear materials are suitable for manufacturing nuclear weapons, and 
these materials vary considerably in their potential for environmen­
tal contamination. 
The fuel for all commercial reactors originates from naturally 
occurring uranium ore. This ore consists of varying amounts of two 
different kinds of uranium. 2 The type of uranium in highest concen­
tration is uranium-238 (U238). Uranium-238 alone is insufficient to 
serve as fuel. It cannot be used to manufacture weapons, and it has 
little potential as a toxic health hazard. It is uranium-235 (U235), 
however, that is the key element to nuclear power production. The 
fraction of uranium-235 occurring in natural ore is so small that no 
amount of natural uranium could be used to run a United States 
power plant3 or to manufacture a nuclear weapon. 
1. The Light Water Reactor (LWR) 
The United States nuclear power industry is firmly established 
around the Light Water Reactor (LWR). To fuel these reactors, 
natural uranium is enriched to 2-4 percent of uranitim-235 from its 
naturally occurring concentration of 0.7 percent. This slightly 
enriched uranium cannot sustain a reaction which would produce a 
nuclear explosion and is, therefore, unlikely to represent a serious 
security threat or toxicological hazard. 4 Enriched uranium is fabri­
2. Every chemical element occurs in more than one form. These forms, called 
isotopes, do not differ at all in their behavior relative to other chemical elements. 
The only difference in isotopes of the same chemical element is their weights. Isoto­
pic separation can only be done by using the weight difference of the atoms them­
selves. This is far more difficult than separating different chemical elements. It 
should be noted that "heavy water" is chemically the same as light water (natural 
water) but contains hydrogen-2 instead of hydrogen-I. This difference is analogous 
to uranium-238 being a heavier isotope of uranium than uranium-235. 
3. The Canadian designed, heavy water moderated CANDU reactor uses natu­
rally occurring uranium but requires a large inventory of heavy water. Manufa<;:turing 
heavy water entails very sophisticated techniques and extensive facilities riot a..v.aila­
ble without enormous investment due to the extreme difficulty of separatin'g the' dif­
ferent isotopes of hydrogen which distinguish heavy water from light water. 
4. AD Hoc WRITING GROUP OF THE SAFEGUARDS COMMITTEE, INSTITUTE OF 
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT, ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS FOR 
Low-ENRICHED URANIUM (1976) (a special report appearing in NUCLEAR MATERI­
ALS MANAGEMENT (August 1976)). 
Uranium must be enriched to high levels (50-90%) to be used in nuclear weap­
ons. Uranium enrichment requires technologies and facilities currently available to 
only a few national governments. The development of new enrichment techniques 
reduces the difficulty of producing enriched uranium thereby enabling countries 
with limited resources to obtain nuclear weapon grade materials. Designing safe­
guards for control of nuclear materials becomes increasingly difficult as the enrich­
ment technology changes. See Krass, Laser Enrichment of Uranium: The Prolifera­
tion Connection, 196 SCIENCE 721-31 (1977). 
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cated into a fuel assembly and reacted in the power plant. Spent 
fuel is currently stored for future placement in a federal waste de­
pository. 
Several methods have been developed for reprocessing spent 
fuel to recover and recycle any unreacted uranium-235. In addi­
tion, complex reprocessing schemes may be used to recover pluto­
nium (PU239) which is produced in small quantities as a by-product 
of reactor operation. Plutonium-239 can be w~ed in place of 
uranium-235 as a reactor fuel but can be more easily separated 
from new fuel than uranium-235. Because crude explosive devices 
can be manufactured from separated plutonium, plutonium recov­
ery presents critical security considerations. 5 
2. The Breeder Reactor 
Since the supply of natural uranium is finite, the nuclear com­
munity has searched for more efficient uses of uranium resources. 
The nuclear industry and government regulators have considered 
development of a breeder reactor as one alternative. The breeder 
reactor uses the reaction of uranium-235 to convert the abundant 
but less useful uranium-238 into valuable plutonium-239. A liquid 
metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) produces plutonium-239 in 
greater quantity than the uranium-235 being exhausted. The 
plutonium-239 produced can then be used either as a reactor fuel 
in place of uranium-235, or in mixture with uranium-235 at LWR 
facilities. Since this method increases the efficiency of nuclear fuel 
use by a factor of approximately seventy, it is believed that a 
LWRlLMFBR fuel cycle combination will assure the United States 
a supply of nuclear fuel for hundreds of years. 6 
3. Safeguard Concerns 
Much of the general plan for implementing a LWRlLMFBR 
fuel cycle is not yet fully developed. The fuel in the present LWR 
fuel cycle is an inconsequential threat at the input side of the cy­
cle. The spent fuel contains many dangerous fission products in ad­
5. Because plutonium is a different chemical than uranium, highly concentrated 
weapon grade plutonium can be derived from plutonium bearing fuel by relatively 
simple techniques in contrast to uranium slightly enriched in uranium-235. See note 
2 supra. 
6. R. LAPP, THE NUCLEAR CONTROVERSY 17 (1974). Some have openly at­
tacked this position. See generally T. COCHRAN, THE LIQUID METAL FAST BREEDER 
REACTOR, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (1974). No attempt is made here to deter­
mine what the outcome of this debate will be. This study assumes use of 
LWRlLMFBR fuel cycle in the future. 
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dition to small quantities of plutonium, but it emits such a lethal 
amount of radioactivity that potential thieves are unlikely to be in­
terested in stealing it. 
Recycled plutonium-239 presents several potential security 
threats. Plutonium raises concern about existing safeguards because 
it can be used to manufacture fission bombs and is highly toxic. All 
reprocessing facilities where plutoniun-239 is separated or stored 
must be subject to strict safeguards. 
An individual need not steal spent fuel to cause damage. 
Wherever special nuclear material7 (SNM) is kept, and wherever a 
core meltdownS at a reactor site could occur, there is a potential 
for sabotage. A well-placed, conventional explosive could disperse 
spent fuel in a manner that would greatly endanger lives and prop­
erty. ., 
B. Nuclear Safeguard Activities 
The basic objective of nuclear safeguard strategy is to contain 
special nuclear material (SNM) in an authorized channel where it 
cannot be used malevolently and can be guarded against sabotage. 
Any SNM existing outside authorized channels represents a serious 
security breach. Thus, nuclear safeguard plans should concentrate 
on preventing theft or sabotage of SNM. Careful screening of em­
ployees and tight control over access to the special nuclear material 
are methods employed to physically protect the material from un­
authorized use. Developing an advanced warning system to antic­
ipate attempts to steal or harm the special nuclear material would 
serve a useful purpose should screening and access controls fail. 9 If 
nuclear material is lost or stolen, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis­
sion must provide a plan for its speedy recovery. 
7. The Code of Federal Regulations defines special nuclear material as "pluto­
nium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in isotope 235...." 
10 C.F.R. § 70.4(m)(I) (1978). 
8. If the nuclear fission reaction occurs too rapidly or the reactor cooling sys­
tem fails or is insufficient to control the heat produced by the fission reaction, it is 
possible that a core meltdown could occur, creating severe toxicological hazard in 
the area. 
9. A related safeguard activity is threat analysis. This involves the use of a do­
mestic intelligence network to continuously gather information in an attempt to dis­
cover and deter a nuclear threat before the theft or sabotage occurs. While the gen­
eral civil liberty problems associated with such threat analysis operations have 
become increaSingly clear during the time of the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins, it 
is beyond the scope of this article to deal with this aspect of nuclear safeguards. The 
use of increased domestic intelligence activity is tied to many considerations only 
one of which is nuclear safeguards. 
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Traditional safeguard activities can be categorized as follows: 
1. Access Contral 
Physically controlling access to areas in which the special nu­
clear materials are kept involves using safes and vaults for storage 
of SNM, security guards in and around the storage area, and phys­
ical searches and surveillance of all persons entering and leaving 
the storage areas. If these access control methods were· failsafe, 
there would be no need for other safeguards. As better access con­
trols are developed, the need for other safeguards will decrease. 
2. Employee Screening 
To reduce the risk of theft or sabotage, attempts are made to 
carefully screen employees who are allowed access to secured 
areas. The objective of preemployment screening is early recogni­
tion of persons who are likely to pose a security threat. Screening 
techniques may include background investigations, polygraph tests, 
and psychological testing. Once an individual is employed, an on­
going security evaluation may be required to detect persons who 
may subsequently become a threat. 
3. 	 Recovery Operation 
A recovery operation is designed to quickly locate and recover 
any nuclear material that has been lost or stolen. Once SNM is be­
yond authorized protective channels, it becomes a national security 
threat and a potential health hazard. Immediate, drastic measures 
are necessary once a theft or sabotage is discovered. This need for 
immediate action may result in infringements of civil liberties. 
Since there have been no publicized major occurrences of 
theft or sabotage, existent recovery plans have never been imple­
mented. The effectiveness of these plans, as well as their antic­
ipated threat to civil liberties, remain largely hypothetical. 
C. 	 The Nuclear Regulatory Acts 
Nuclear safeguard legislation is a part of congressional regula­
tion of the nuclear energy field, and it has been the subject of pub­
lic and congressional debate. 10 In order to fully understand safe­
10. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS: SECURITY AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTs-AT BEST, INADEQUATE (1977) 
(EMD-77-32). 
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guard regulations, it is necessary to consider the nuclear regulatory 
scheme. 
Congress granted broad administrative power to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to promulgate regulations that carry 
the force of law. The only limitations on its rulemaking authority 
are those set by the enabling legislation (the Energy Reorganiza­
tion Act and Atomic Energy Act) and the constitution. With re­
gard to security, NRC is empowered to "develop ... contingency 
plans for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to spe­
cial nuclear materials, high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear fa­
cilities resulting from all activities licensed under the Atomic En­
ergy Act of 1954. . . ."11 This mandate includes "processing, 
transport, and handling of nuclear materials, including the provi­
sion and maintenance of safeguards against threats, thefts, and sab­
otage of licensed facilities, and materials. . . . "12 The safeguard 
regulations developed under this statutory authority are based on 
hypothetical threat situations rather than past experience. Conse­
quently, the threat levels anticipated by NRC can be as much in 
controversy as the methods developed to meet those threats. 
D. Civil Liberty Interests 
The term "civil liberties" covers the entire spectrum of indi­
vidual rights and freedoms guaranteed by our constitutional system 
of government. The term includes rights enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom from unreasonable 
search and seizure, as well as personal interests which underlie 
various provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as rights of privacy 
and individual dignity. 13 
Nuclear safeguards may severely restrict these personal civil 
liberties. Evaluation of safeguard activities must transcend the 
question of what the courts would find constitutional. Clearly, if ac­
tivities are unconstitutional they cannot be employed, but the fact 
that a particular safeguard activity would survive a constitutional 
challenge should not end consideration of the impacts on civil 
liberties. A constitutional activity may still be undersirable. Impor­
11. 42 U.S.C. § 5844(b)(2)(B) (1976). 
12. [d. at § 5844(b)(1). 
13. T. DYK, D. MARCUS, & w. KOLASKY, JR., CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPLICATIONS 
OF A SAFEGUARDS PROBLEM FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN THE PRIVATE 
NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRy-REpORT TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
4 (1975). 
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tant civil liberty interests may be severely eroded by lawful as well 
as unlawful activities. 14 The revelations of the late sixties and early 
seventies show conclusively that when the government perceives a 
compelling need to compromise civil liberties in a covert manner, 
the absence of ongoing and strict control often results in serious 
civil liberty violations. 
The rights guaranteed by the Constitution are not interpreted 
by the United States Supreme Court as absolute and are often bal­
anced against other public interests. IS The Supreme Court has re­
peatedly demonstrated its willingness to restrict civil liberties if 
sufficient public need is shown, or to strengthen traditional defini­
tions of constitutional rights if unwarranted intrusions are per­
ceived. ls An important aspect of the judicial balancing of civil lib­
erty interests is the presumption that, when all things are equal, 
the civil liberty will stand untouched. 
Nuclear safeguard techniques may affect first amendment 
rights of free speech and association, fifth amendment rights of due 
process and self-incrimination, and the fourth amendment right of 
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. This article will an­
alyze the civil liberties concern within the context of each particu­
lar safeguard activity. 
The potential consequences of a nuclear safeguards breach are 
so catastrophic that the safeguards issue poses an urgency and sig­
nificance that regulatory policymakers are unaccustomed to facing. 
The growing pressure to employ an effective safeguards strategy 
creates a danger of disregarding the civil liberties implications of 
that strategy. In a society which values political freedom and indi­
vidual rights highly, it is essential to evaluate the potential impact 
of imposing prospective safeguard measures. 
The assessment of potential civil liberty intrusions must in­
clude an examination of the doctrinal options available to accommo­
date the safeguard activity. Precedents are valuable, but not con­
14. [d. at 2-3. 
15. Seizure without due process, for example, has been upheld in several in­
stances upon showing a compelling state interest. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 
(1946) (bank failure); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 
(1908) (unwholesome food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (smallpox 
vaccination). 
16. The United States Supreme Court held until 1967 that electronic surveil­
lance was not a search as used in the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. 
Olmstead v, United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Court has since recognized that 
electronic surveillance is technologically capable of intruding anywhere and that the 
need to physically trespass to gain information was no longer required. Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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clusive. Many proposed safeguard activities are analogous to those 
already used in other areas of security. 17 There are also a substan­
tial number of activities, however, for which no precedents exist. 
In light of the unique nature of many proposed nuclear safeguard 
activities, comparison to existing precedents is, in many cases, dif­
ficult. It is impossible to predict accurately how a court may re­
spond to a constitutional challenge to these activities. Where pre­
cedents are not well-established, all available options must be 
examined. 
The purpose of this analysis is to provide a basis upon which 
debate can be initiated concerning civil liberty impacts of nuclear 
safeguards. Such a debate is necessary to clarifY the issues so that 
NRC can respond appropriately if it is challenged. In light of the 
very broad delegation of power Congress has granted to NRC, it is 
clearly advantageous to fully air the issues of nuclear safeguard ef­
fects on constitutionally protected rights and the available doctrinal 
options in advance of rule making or litigation. 
II. EMPLOYEE SCREENING 
A fundamental method of safeguarding SNM is to screen indi­
viduals who may be granted access to nuclear facilities. This secu­
rity measure is designed to prevent the employment of individuals 
who might attempt to use their position to engage in the sabotage 
or theft of SNM. Since safeguard strategy dictates that those per­
sons with access to sensitive positions in the nuclear industry be of 
trustworthy character, a preemployment screening process is es­
sential. Two methods are primarily used to assess an individual's 
trustworthiness: Investigation of the individual's past activities and 
investigation of the individual's contemporary status. 1S Employee 
17. For example, in employee screening, compulsory disclosure questionnaires 
have been used extensively in non-nuclear employment situations. 
18. Presently employees of the nuclear energy industry are screened according 
to methods in the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Guide. Included in 
the screenirig activities is the suggestion that licensees screen their own employees. 
The standard suggested is that of the American National Standard Institute (ANSI). 
Regulatory guides are suggested methods for complying with regulations. At the bot­
tom of each NRC guide, the NRC states: 
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public 
methods acceptable to the NRC staff of implementing specific parts of the 
Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in 
evaluating specific problems of postulated accidents, or to provide guidance 
to applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, and 
compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from 
those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the 
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screening security programs are not new. They are currently used 
for many sensitive governmental job positions in federal and state 
law enforcement agencies, the military, and national security agen­
cies, such as the FBI and the CIA. Consideration must be given 
whether the extension of similar employee screening activities into 
the civilian nuclear power industry, under NRC guidelines, will 
merit constitutional justification. 
A. 	 Legal Authority for Employee Screening Programs 
Current NRC security clearance procedures, promulgated 
mostly in the 1950's, were originally designed for the protection of 
restricted data and national security information. 19 These proce­
dures do not address the security objective of preventing the loss 
or diversion of special nuclear material. With the growth of the nu­
clear industry and the increased need to protect that industry, it 
has become clear that new security rules must be promulgated. 
Concomitant with the desire to protect the industry is the need to 
protect the industry's employees from the adverse effects of an 
overly intrusive security clearance program. Therefore, current and 
prospective security procedures must be carefully balanced be-
findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a pennit or license by 
the Commission. 
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY GUIDE 1.109 
(1977) (an example of the editorial note on the front page of each issue). 
ANSI standard 18.17 suggests procedures which are vague and applied some­
what inconsistently: 
4.3 Employee Screening. Procedures shall be employed for making a 
detennination of the acceptability of candidates for nuclear plant employ­
ment and the continuing acceptability of employees with regard to their 
trustworthiness. These procedures shall include, as a minimum, the follow­
ing provisions: 
(1) an investigation, either prior to employment or prior to assignment to a 
position allowing access without escort, to disclose adverse character traits 
that might bear on his abilities or motivation to discharge his duties in a re­
sponsible manner. 
(2) examination by a licensed psychiatrist or physician, or other person pro­
fessionally trained to identify aberrant behavior, either prior to employment 
or prior to assignment to a position allowing access without escort, for the 
purpose of observing and disqualifying persons displaying indications of 
emotional instability such that there is reasonable doubt the person could 
discharge his duties in a competent manner. 
(3) continued observation of all employees and appropriate corrective meas­
ures by responsible supervisors for indications of aberrant behavior of per­
sonnel in the course of performance of their duties. 
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD INSTITUTE, AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD FOR 
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS NI8.17-1973 (1973). 
19. See 10 C.F.R. § 10.1 (1978). 
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tween safeguard interests and intrusions upon personal civil 
liberties. 
In 1974, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act to author­
ize the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to establish employee 
screening programs for private companies with access to special nu­
clear materials. 20 The very brief legislative history of the 1974 
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act indicates that Congress was 
probably unaware that it was authorizing a nuclear industry secu­
rity program of such potentially broad impact on constitutionally 
protected rights. The legislation was passed as part of a package of 
amendments described as "an AEC housekeeping bill." The only 
recorded House discussion was a brief remark that the security 
program was a "clarification and expansion of the Commission's au­
thority with respect to licensing people who handle nuclear fuels . 
. "21 There was no recorded Senate debate on the provision. 22 
1. Proposed Program 
In 1977, NRC proposed changes in its employee screening 
regulations. 23 These changes provide that nuclear industry employ­
ees in sensitive positions be required to obtain the equivalent of a 
top secret security clearance. This proposal is similar to the cur­
rent program used for protection of classified information. Two lev­
20. The NRC may: 
[P]rescribe such regulations or orders as it may deem necessary (1) to pro­
tect Restricted Data received by any person in connection with any activity 
authorized pursuant to this chapter, (2) to guard against the loss or diversion 
of any special nuclear material acquired by any person pursuant to section 
2073 of this title or produced by any person in connection with any activity 
authorized pursuant to this chapter, to prevent any use or disposition thereof 
which the Commission may determine to be inimical to the common de­
fense and security, including regulations or orders designating activities, 
involving quantities of speCial nuclear material which in the opinion of the 
Commission are important to the common defense and security, that may be 
conducted only by persons whose character, associations, and loyalty shall 
have been investigated under standards and specifications established by 
the Commission and as to whom the Commission shall have determined that 
permitting each such person to conduct the activity will not be inimical to 
the common defense and security, and (3) to govern any activity authorized 
pursuant to this chapter, including standards and restrictions governing the 
design, location, and operation of facilities used in the conduct of such activ­
ity, in order to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property. 
42 U.S.C. § 2201(i) (1976). 
21. 120 CONGo REc. 26373 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hosmer). 
22. ld. at 22879-81 (1974). For a general legislative history see Comment, 
Policing Plutonium: The Civil Liberties Fallout, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 369, 
396 n.130 (1975). 
23. 42 Fed. Reg. 14,880 (1977). 
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els of security clearance are specified, "u" and "R." The "U" level 
clearance would be required for all employees in very sensitive po­
sitions, and the lower "R" clearance would be required for all other 
employees. It is estimated that two-thirds of all nuclear industry 
employees would need "U" clearances. 
The higher "u" clearance requires an exhaustive pre-screening 
investigation including a full field investigation and a National 
Agency Check (NAC). The lower "R" clearance involves only the 
NAC. All employees would be expected to undergo security clear­
ance procedures which had the same standards and criteria as the 
program used for granting access to classified material. The criteria 
should be used so that "careful application of ... [the] ... crite­
ria could recognize the differences between access of SNM and ac­
cess to classified information. . . . "24 
The major concerns with the new screening program from a 
civil liberties standpoint involve the use of national security author­
ity to justify the program, and the lack of tangible evidence 
demonstrating the need for, or probable success of, the new clear­
ance program. No evidence has been advanced to support the con­
tention that the characteristics of a nuclear saboteur or thief are the 
same as, or even similar to, those of an individual who compro­
mises classified material. The mandate for "careful application" of 
criteria to account for different characteristics is vague in the ab­
sence of clear guidelines. Furthermore, current screening criteria 
have never been validated. 
The Atomic Energy Act uses both "health, safety, and welfare" 
and "common defense and security" (national security) justifications 
for most delegations of authority to NRC. The amendment author­
izing NRC to establish a personnel screening program makes no 
mention of health, safety, or welfare. 25 Therefore, the program 
may be promulgated into law only if national security interests are 
at stake. The NRC assertion that nuclear reactors pose no serious 
threat to the health and safety of the American public does not har­
monize with its contention that sabotage of a reactor justifies action 
of the government under its national security power. There is real 
doubt as to whether NRC can legitimately conduct personnel 
screening programs consistent with the Atomic Energy Act and the 
24. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, AUTHORITY FOR 
ACCESS TO OR CONTROL OVER SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL; HEARINGS ON 10 
C.F.R. § 11, at 20 (1978) (NRC Doc. RM50-7) (testimony of NRC staff). 
25. See note 20 supra. 
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federal government stance on the national security aspects of re­
actor sabotage. Furthermore, the new NRC guidelines are vague at 
best and fail to adequately address the distinction between access 
to restricted data and access to SNM. 
2. Scope and Effectiveness of the Security Clearance Program 
The magnitude of a nuclear safeguard screening program, 
which might be minor compared to the total federal personnel 
screening program, may appear insignificant when viewed in light 
of their objective-prevention of the theft of SNM or the sabotage 
of a reactor or facility containing SNM. Current screening pro­
grams are designed primarily for the protection of information26 
and the denial of access to those individuals who may place foreign 
interests over those of the United States. 27 The objectives of nu­
clear industry screening programs, however, must go beyond sim­
ple data protection. Safeguard screening activities must deny access 
to those who would conduct violent antisocial behavior in militant 
opposition to domestic policies and are, therefore, likely to be 
thieves or saboteurs. A safeguard screening program dealing with 
the physical aspect of nuclear protection must (1) guard against in­
ternal sabotage, (2) reduce the risk of employee theft of small 
quantities of SNM, and (3) reduce the threat that a group planning 
forcible theft could establish a link on the inside of a nuclear facil­
ity.28 While current clearance procedures are stringent, they have 
failed to fully protect classified information. In many respects, the 
loss of a significant quantity of SNM poses a more serious threat 
than loss of classified information. 29 Because of the devastating con­
sequences of a successful diversion of SNM, screening activities for 
purposes of material access will probably increase. 
Employee screening currently involves the gathering of infor­
mation about the job candidate to objectively evaluate his or her 
suitability for the position. The industry has available to it several 
different information gathering techniques. Each provides different 
levels of information, and involves a different level of personal in­
trusion. 
26. 10 C.F.R. § 10.1 (1978). 
27. See Comment, supra note 22, at 395-96. 
28. M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS 137 
(1974). 
29. Id. 
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B. Employee Screening Activities 
1. Historical Techniques 
Historical techniques are characterized by investigation and 
disclosure of an individual's "character, associations, and loyalty" to 
determine if they are such that allowing access to SNM would be 
"inimical to the common defense and security."30 These techniques 
include compulsory disclosure questionnaires, national agency 
checks, and full-field investigations. 31 
a. Compulsory Disclosure Questionnaires 
Compulsory disclosure is a requirement of all current screen­
ing programs aimed at controlling classified information. These pro­
grams have existed in the nuclear industry since the early 1950's 
when a screening program was established by the Atomic Energy 
Commission pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act. The technique in­
volves mandatory disclosure of personal information considered rel­
evant to evaluating suitability for the particular job classification. 
b. National Agency Checks (NAC) 
Various governmental and quasi-governmental agencies, 
including the Department of Defense, Department of Motor Vehi­
cles, and federal and state police agencies, obtain and store per­
sonal information concerning individuals' associations, background, 
and past activities. A thorough security background investigation 
usually involves a check of all available governmental files. 
c. Full-Field Investigations 
Full-field investigations involve informational interviews with 
neighbors, friends, and associates of the prospective employee. In 
these interviews, detailed questions are asked regarding the appli­
cant's background and lifestyle. This type of investigatory tech­
nique is clearly the most thorough form of background check short 
of direct personal surveillance.32 
2. Contemporary Techniques 
Contemporary techniques, called Personal Reliability Assess­
ment,33 are characterized by inquiry into an individual's mental 
30. See note 20 supra. 
31. T. DYK, D. MARCUS, & W. KOLASKY, JR., supra note 13, at 62. 
32. [d. at 67. 
33. J. BARTON, INTENSIFIED NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 
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and emotional make-up at the time of employment to identify un­
stable personalities. The concern of the industry is that employees 
with such personalities might, because of external or internal pres­
sure, undertake theft or sabotage of SNM. 34 
The objectives of this facet of personal screening programs go 
beyond merely identifying potential mental illness. Criteria may be 
promulgated to assess whether or not an individual's basic person­
ality and other behavioral traits make it advisable that he or she 
have access to SNM.35 Personal Reliability Assessment techniques 
include psychological testing and evaluation, polygraph tests, and 
organic correlations to violent behavior. 
C. Civil Liberty Infringements by Employee Screening Activities 
The rights of civilian employees in the nuclear power industry 
are directly affected by security clearance screening programs. 
Since the guidelines for these screening programs are established 
by the NRC pursuant to express Congressional authorization in the 
Atomic Energy Act,36 some commentators have suggested that 
these industry programs involve state action enabling employees to 
constitutionally challenge the procedures. 37 Regardless of the prob­
ability of success of such a constitutional challenge, proposed and 
prospective screening activities have the potential to seriously in­
trude upon the personal civil liberty interests of individuals em­
ployed in the nuclear power industry. Many of the employee 
screening activities herein considered may well be held to be le­
gally valid, despite the fact that they infringe to some degree upon 
the individual's constitutional rights. The ensuing analysis seeks to 
prospectively recognize how civil liberties may be eroded by such 
activities. 
Employee screening activities infringe on an individual's first 
amendment rights of speech and association by excluding the indi­
vidual from the job market because of past or present associations 
(October 31, 1975) (NRC contract no. AT (4.9-24)-0190). 
34. T. DYK, D. MARCUS, & W. KOLASKY, JR., supra note 13, at 55. 
35. Id. The use of PRA's is not unprecedented. The Board of Appeals of the 
United States Civil Service Commission has dismissed a challenge of the Federal 
Aviation Agency's use of a personality test. The Board found that "the 16 PF test [a 
performance test] is a valid measurement of traits necessary to the position of air traf­
fic control specialist," and that "the test deprived the Appellee of no constitutional 
rights." In re D.E.L., No. 752B-74-524 at 6 (United States Civ. Servo Comm'n Bd. 
of App., April 16, 1974). 
36. See note 20 supra. 
37. See Comment, supra note 22, at 387. 
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with political or subversive groups. Exclusion based solely on an 
individual's organizational membership has been held to be viola­
tive of first amendment rights. 38 The United States Supreme Court 
has determined that a guilt by association rationale does not justify 
denying an individual constitutionally guaranteed rights. An em­
ployee's past or present activities with a subversive organization, as 
opposed to his or her beliefs, may be considered in the determi­
nation of a security clearance. 39 The Supreme Court has indicated 
that screening should be limited in scope to employees whose 
positions are vulnerable to diversion, inside collaboration with 
theft, or serious acts of sabotage. 4o The criteria of even a narrowly 
drawn screening program must be implemented in a fair and objec­
tive manner. The problems of carefully narrowing the scope of any 
screening program do not end with the procedural guidelines. The 
industry must realize that the administrators of such programs 
must not curtail the applicant's first amendment rights by using an 
overbroad interpretative analysis of the employee's background 
data. 
Each of the various screening mechanisms has the potential for 
inhibiting or curtailing the applicant's first amendment rights. Inhi­
bition of constitutional rights is not determinative of validity; com­
pulsory disclosure, for example, has been upheld by the courts. 
Yet the use and interpretation of overly broad questions may in­
38. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). The Supreme Court declared 
that membership in a communist action organization was not a sufficient basis to 
deny a machinist employment in a national defense shipyard. The appeal in Robel 
involved the determination of whether Section 5(a)(I)(D) of the Subversive Activities 
Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987, by 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(I)(D) 
(1976) was constitutional. Under the statute, the denial of employment was "an 
unconstitutional abridgement of the right of association protected by the First 
Amendment." 389 U.S. at 261. 
39. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968). The United States Supreme Court 
struck down a Coast Guard employment policy which required applicants for a mer­
chant marine license to complete a disclosure questionnaire which included the 
compulsory listing of past organizational affiliations. Under the authority of the 
Magnuson Act, 50 U.S.C. § 194 (1976), President Truman promulgated regulations, 
33 C.F.R. Pt. 6 (1950), which allowed the Commandant of the Coast Guard to with­
hold a permit unless the "character and habit of life of such person are such as to au­
thorize the belief that the presence of the individual on board would not be inimical 
to the security of the United States," 390 U.S. at 19. In its ruling, the Court indicated 
that the withholding of employment could be justified on the basis of acts but not 
solely on beliefs. Id. at 26. "No act of sabotage or espionage or act inimical to the 
security of the United States is raised or charged in the present case." Id. See 
Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) 
(upholding the use of a compulsory disclosure questionnaire for admission to the 
bar). 
40. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1968). 
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trude upon an applicant's first amendment rights. Inquiry into an 
individual's background may constitute an invasion of privacy, 41 
where the investigator probes factors of limited or unrelated value 
to the issue of employee suitability. The individual may success­
fully challenge the particular investigatory mechanism on the basis 
of the commonly accepted notion that privacy requires some core 
of the personality be kept outside the notice of society. 42 
Fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination may be in­
fringed by employee screening programs that involve polygraphs. 
In the United States Supreme Court's view, results of a polygraph 
test may be testimonial in nature,43 so that requiring a person to 
submit to the polygraph is tantamount to requiring him or her to 
testify to personal aspects of his or her life. Since the right against 
self-incrimination is characterized as a fundamental right,44 only a 
Compelling state interest may override it.. Precluding employment 
by denying a security clearance amounts to a loss of liberty and 
property under the law. 45 Therefore, due process requires that the 
screening criteria used by the industry must not be overly broad or 
46vague. Further, the denial of the security clearance must be 
done in a manner in which the prospective employee is afforded a 
fair hearing. 47 
According to present regulations, an individual may be denied 
41. Privacy has been characterized as a fundamental right by the United States 
Supreme Court. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (right of personal privacy 
held to include woman's right to early abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479,494 (1965) (right of marital privacy held to encompass the use of contraceptives). 
A compelling state interest must be shown to infringe on the right of privacy. Kramer 
v. Union Free School Dist. no. 15, 395 U.S .. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). 
42. See Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L. J. 1462, 1474 (1973). 
43. The United States Supreme Court has stated: 

Some tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical evidence," for example, lie 

detector tests measuring changes in bodily functions during interrogation, 

may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimo­

nial. To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be 

made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological re­

sponses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth 

Amendment. 

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 
44. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
45. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959). 
46. Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). 
47. "Fair Hearing" is a term usually used in connection with administrative 
proceedings and connotes a hearing in which safeguards are taken to comply with 
the fifth amendment's due process requirements ... 
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clearance if he or she "has abused trust, has been dishonest, or has 
engaged in infamous, immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct 
without adequate evidence of reformation. "48 If an individual is ex­
cluded on anyone of these reasons, without adequate notice and 
an opportunity to be heard, the exclusion from employment would 
violate the fifth amendment. 
The mere fact that employee screening programs may be 
found to be constitutionally valid must not end the inquiry into 
their potential effects. Constitutionally authorized intrusions on civil 
liberties are, nonetheless, intrusions and represent a definite social 
cost of the nuclear energy alternative. The rapid growth of the nu­
clear power industry will bring an increasingly large portion of the 
civilian population within the industry. The increased number of 
employees, together with the enormous risks posed by the adop­
tion of the breeder reactor fuel cycle, may result in a proportional 
increase in the intensity of pre-screening activities. An exaggerated 
response by the NRC to an actual theft or threat could lead to the 
imposition of even more onerous screening methods. 
III. PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROLS 
Controlling physical access to areas that contain SNM is an es­
sential objective of nuclear safeguards strategy. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission has issued regulations for the physical se­
curity of all facilities licensed to handle special nuclear materials. 49 
The NRC regulations call for establishment of a security organiza­
tion to "provide physical protection against industrial sabotage and 
against theft of special nuclear material. . . . "50 Prior to gaining en­
try into a security area, the regulations require that all persons and 
packages be searched for weapons or explosives. 51 Upon exit from 
a material access area, all persons and packages must again be 
searched for concealed nuclear material. 52 In addition, individuals 
within the safeguarded area must be kept under constant observa­
tion. 53 
Various methods of search and observation are available to the 
48. 10 C.F.R. § 1O.11(b)(8) (1978). 
49. 10 C.F.R. § 73.40 (1978). NRC also requires the establishment of a 
"security organization, including guards, to protect [the] facility against industrial 
sabotage and the special nuclear material in his possession against theft." Id. 
§ 73.50(a)( 1). 
SO. Id. § 73.40. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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nuclear power industry. The relative intrusive effects of physical 
access control alternatives will be examined to evaluate their cost 
in tenns of civil liberties infringements. 
A. State Action 
A threshold question concerning the effects of these safeguard 
activities on constitutionally protected rights is whether the activi­
ties of nuclear power company employees are subject to fourth 
amendment protections. The United States Supreme Court, in 
Camara v. Municipal Court54 interpreted the purpose of the fourth 
amendment as "to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions by government officials. "55 If a search is 
conducted by a private company primarily for its own interests, the 
search is outside fourth amendment requirements. 56 
Searches conducted pursuant to NRC regulation are analogous 
to those conducted by the airline industry at airports. Both are re­
quired by federal regulation in the interest of public safety. 57 In 
several federal court decisions, Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) authorization has been held insufficient to characterize air­
line searches as government searches. 58 
In United States v. Fannon,59 however, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit ruled that airport searches are within the 
reach of the fourth amendment because there was sufficient gov­
ernmental authorization and involvement to render the search gov­
ernmental. 60 Other courts are in conflict on this issue, however. 
54. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
55. [d. at 528 (emphasis added). 
56. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1921). 
57. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1978) (requires airport searches); 14 C.F.R. § 107.4 
(1978) (requires the presence of law enforcement officers at airports). 
58. See United States v. Freeland 562 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
957 (1977). But see United States V. Fannon,. 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Ford, 525 
F.2d 1308 (lOth Cir. 1975); United States V. Issod, 508 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975); United States V. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); United States V. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 
1973); United States v. Ogden, 485 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
987 (1974). 
59. 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977). But compare United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 
1365, 1371 (8th Cir. 1976), and United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149, 1153 (7th 
Cir. 1975), with United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane). 
See also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). 
60. 556 F.2d at 964-65. The overriding purpose of the regulations was to thwart 
"a real and demonstrable threat to the public safety which the public authorities, 
notably the police, have traditionally been relied upon to combat." [d. at 964. The 
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Some courts have held that airport searches conducted by airlines 
to prevent injury to customers and damage to property are non­
governmental searches outside the fourth amendment. 61 Assuming, 
however, that the nuclear industry's physical security program is 
viewed as governmental, and therefore subject to fourth amend­
ment requirements, an analysis of the program's impact on per­
sonal privacy is appropriate. 
The major area of concern from a civil liberties viewpoint is 
the effect of access control activities on the physical privacy of em­
ployees and visitors to nuclear facilities. Physical privacy intrusions 
have traditionally been analyzed in terms of the fourth amendment 
guarantees. The fourth amendment provides that people have the 
right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . "62 To protect this 
right, the fourth amendment requires that search warrants be is­
sued only "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per­
sons or things to be seized. "63 
The courts have applied th~ fourth amendment by different 
standards when the search involved is considered administrative 
rather than criminal. A criminal search connotes hostility by the 
searching officer toward the individual whose privacy is invaded in 
that the ultimate goal of the search is a criminal prosecution. 
The fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures is also applicable to searches and inspections con­
ducted by administrative and regulatory agencies,64 even though 
Fannon decision was based on United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973), 
which brought all searches conducted in conjunction with the airport search program 
of the FAA within the reach of the fourth amendment because the searches were 
"part of a nationwide anti-hijacking program conceived, directed, and implemented 
by federal officials in cooperation with air carriers." ld. at 897. 
61. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has approached the issue from 
an opposite direction than the Ninth Circuit. Rather than measure the amount of gov­
ernmental involvement in the search program, the court considered the primary pur­
pose of the company in conducting the search. In United States v. Wilkerson, 478 
F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1973), the court stated, "[Slearches of luggage by airline employ­
ees are private searches that are invulnerable to fourth amendment attack so long as 
the searches are conducted by the carrier for its own purposes and without the insti­
gation or participation of government officers." ld. at 815. See United States v. 
Freeland, 562 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 957 (1977). See Note, The 
Constitutionality of Airport Searches, 72 MICH. L. REV. 128, 136 n.57 (1978); 
Ingram, Are Airport Searches Still Reasonable?, 44 J. AIR L. 131, 138 nAl (1978). 
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
63. ld. 
64. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Camara v. Municipal Court, 
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these intrusions are generally less hostile in nature than the typical 
police officer's search for the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. 
They are, however, deemed quasi-criminal because "most reg­
ulatory laws . . . are enforced by criminal processes. "65 Although 
administrative searches are not aimed at seeking out criminal activ­
ities, cases dealing with civil searches are not void of suspect crimi­
nal activity. 66 
While administrative searches are not required to meet the 
traditional fourth amendment requirement of probable cause, they 
must, nevertheless, be reasonable. The Supreme Court in Camara 
established the formula by which the reasonableness of an adminis­
trative search can be established without showing a probability that 
contraband will be produced in every search. The need to search 
and the interest of the government in regulating the particular ac­
tivity, must be balanced against the invasion of privacy involved. 67 
Since the administrative search is considered only a minimal inva­
sion of privacy, if the regulatory purpose for the inspection is 
deemed significant, the search will probably be held reasonable. 
Airport searches have been considered within the context of 
administrative searches. In United States v. Davis,68 the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "searches conducted as part 
of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative 
purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation . . . , may 
be permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not sup­
ported by a showing of probable cause .... "69 
The Camara Court determined that civil searches fall within 
the warrant requirement. 7o In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 
387 U.S. 523 (1967); Note, Inspections by Administrative Agencies: Clarification of 
the Warrant Requirement, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 879 (1974). 
65. 387 U.S. at 531. 
66. Id. The Supreme Court in Camara recognized that administrative searches 
involved regulatory laws which "were enforced by the criminal processes." Id. 
67. "[Tlhere can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by 
balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails." Id. at 
536-37. 
68. 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). 
69. Id. at 908. 
70. 387 U.S. at 531. The Court's primary concern in establishing a warrant re­
quirement was to curb the unbridled discretion of the agent in the field. Id. at 
532-33. Camara overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which had held 
that administrative searches were not subject to the warrant requirement of the 
fourth amendment. The Court stated that the fourth amendment interests at stake in 
these inspection cases are not merely "peripheral." "It is .surely anomalous to say 
that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amend­
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States,71 the United States Supreme Court struck down an admin­
istrative search for failure to obtain a warrant. The Court stipulated 
that the enabling legislation in the Colonnade case did not provide 
for warrantless searches, but that "Congress [did have] broad 
power to design such powers of inspection . . . as it deems neces­
sary to meet the evils at hand. "72 
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,73 the United States Supreme 
Court struck down enabling legislation that allowed warrantless 
searches. While it rejected warrantless searches that were author­
ized by the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Court held 
that warrants required for certain administrative searches could be 
issued upon a lesser showing of probable cause than is required for 
criminal searches. 74 
The logic of these decisions would seem to place indiscrimi­
nate civil searches conducted at nuclear facilities into the category 
of administrative searches since they are part of a program de­
signed to deter criminal activity rather than pursue criminal ac­
tions. Because the NRC regulations specifically authorize them, 
searches made pursuant to the regulations may be outside the war­
rant requirement. If the warrantless searches are held to be legiti­
mate, any contraband discovered in a reasonable search is admissi­
ble as evidence. 75 
B. Physical Access Control Activities 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires its licensees to 
safeguard nuclear material in accordance with its regulations. The 
United States Nuclear Regulatory_ Commission Guides76 (NRC 
ment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Id. at 530 (foot­
note omitted). 
71. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
72. Id. at 76. 
73. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
74. Id. at 320-21. 
75. Reasonableness is determined by balancing the public interest in con­
trolling unathorized use of nuclear materials with the need to guard against sabotage 
to the nuclear industry while considering the privacy interests of those searched. If, 
on the other hand, warrants are required, courts may allow a Barlow's type of show­
ing of probable cause to suffice. 
76. Regulatory guides are issued to describe and make available to the public 
methods acceptable to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
regulatory staff for implementing specific parts of the NRC's regulations, to delin­
eate techniques used by the staff in evaluating specific problems or post!Jlated acci­
dents, or to provide guidance to applicants. Regulatory guides are not substitutes for 
regulations and compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions differ­
ent from those set forth in the regulatory guide will be acceptable if they provide a 
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guides) contain descriptions of activities which will satisfY these re­
quirements. The guides state: 
One element of this protection is proper control of access of 
personnel to and from protected areas, vital areas, and material 
access areas. Searching persons and packages for firearms, explo­
sives, and other devices which could aid in sabotage or theft of 
SNM is another element of physical protection. 77 
The guides address two rather distinct conditions under which 
access controls will operate: Usual day-to-day conditions and emer­
gency conditions in which either an accident or emergency occurs, 
or a significant amount of SNM is discovered missing. 
1. Normal Day-to-Day Operation 
Normal operations call for searches of all entering and exiting 
personnel and visual surveillance of personnel within the facility. 
The guides suggest: 
Searching of individuals can be carried out by means of 
hands-on search ("frisking"), or by means of devices which will 
detect the presence of weapons and explosives or SNM con­
cealed on the individual, or by a combination of both. The 
search should be conducted in a manner which (1) provides as­
surance that firearms, explosives, and other such contraband are 
not being carried into the protected area and that SNM is not 
being transported out of a material access area and (2) minimized 
inconvenience to the individuals being searched. The use of 
equipment capable of detecting weapons, explosives, or SNM is 
usually the preferable form of searching, since the use of detec­
tion devices avoids the personal imposition of a hands-on 
search. 78 
The clear preference for avoiding the personal imposition of a 
physical search is most likely a response to judicial concerns that 
the "least onerous means" be used to achieve the safeguard objec­
tive. The guides go on to suggest the use of "airport type" weapons 
detectors, hand-held or passageway explosive detectors, and de­
vices to monitor the presence of SNM.79 Standard access controls 
in nuclear facilities may include the use of mechanical "hands-off" 
basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a pennit or license 
by the NRC. 
77. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY GUIDE 
5.7A (1973). 
78. Jd. 5.7B. 
79. [d. 
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detection devices, inspection of packages, use of change rooms, vis­
ual surveillance, pat-down body searches, and strip searches in­
cluding body searches. 
a. Mechanical "Hands-Off' Detection Devices 
The courts have addressed the constitutional issues raised by 
the use of a magnetometer to search boarding passengers in air­
ports. The use of this device has been upheld as an "absolutely 
minimal invasion in all respects of a passenger's privacy [when] 
weighed against the great threat to hundreds of persons if a hi­
jacker is able to proceed . . . undetected. . . . "80 As justification 
for the intrusion, it has been noted that "the plane may become a 
weapon of mass destruction that no ordinary person would have 
any way of obtaining except through hijacking. "81 The analogy that 
SNM is a weapon of mass destruction, and that no ordinary person 
would have any way of obtaining it except through illegal diver­
sion, is apparent. The magnetometer search does not differ signifi­
cantly from the use of other mechanical detection devices including 
explosive and SNM detectors. 
Since the use of a magnetometer at airports to scan millions of 
travelers every year has been upheld, there is little doubt that the 
courts could easily and lawfully accommodate the use of mechanical 
detection devices in the far more limited scope of safeguarding nu­
clear facilities. Such an extension would require no fundamental 
change in case law; and the privacy intrusion involved would be 
minimal. 
b. Inspection of Packages 
The NRC guides state: 
No individual should be allowed to directly hand carry any pack­
age, valise, tool box, or similar hand-carryable item into the pro­
tected area or out of a material access area. Such objects should 
be handed to an attendant guard or watchman who will check 
them and pass them into the protected area or out of the mate­
rial access area. 82 
BO. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, B06 (2d Cir. 1974). 
B1. Id. at B02. The court described the use of magnetometers as an "absolutely 
minimal invasion ... of ... privacy...." Id. at B06. "There is no detention at all; 
there is no 'probing into an individual's private life and thoughts... .' " Id. at B06 
(citation omitted). 
B2. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY GUIDE 
5.7B (1973). 
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The courts have considered the search of carry-on luggage in 
the airport situation a reasonable search. 83 Similarly, the protection 
of government personnel and property has been held to outweigh 
the privacy intrusion involved in searching individuals entering 
courthouses. 84 Since these inspection techniques have been upheld 
in airport and courthouse contexts, the way is clear for courts to 
view as "reasonable" the inspection of packages and parcels in the 
much more limited context of access to facilities containing SNM. 
c. Pat-Down Body Searches 
Once the mechanical search has indicated that an individual 
may possess concealed contraband, the focus of the search becomes 
much more personal, hostile, and generally intrusive. The search 
then exceeds the limits of an administrative search and becomes 
more like a criminal search. Courts combine aspects of administra­
tive and criminal standards to satisfy fourth amendment guarantees 
when these more intensive searches are required in the context of 
an airport search. The initial mechanical search is upheld as a rea­
sonable administrative search. The affirmative results of this search 
provide the requisite level of suspicion necessary to conduct the 
closer criminal search. In the airport search context, the statistical 
probability that weapons will be found in only five percent of the 
body searches conducted was, nevertheless, held sufficient to jus­
tify the invasion when balanced against the danger at stake. 85 The 
83. "A pre-boarding screening of all passengers and carry-on articles sufficient 
in scope to detect the presence of weapons or explosives is reasonably necessary...." 
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973). 
84. Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F. Supp. 266, 274 (1971). "When the interest in pro­
tection of the government property and personnel from destruction is balanced 
against any invasion to the entrant's personal dignity, privacy, and constitutional 
rights, the government's substantial interest in conducting the cursory inspection 
outweighs t/le personal inconvenience suffered by the individual." Id. The Barrett 
court relied on the non-accusatory nature of the search to minimize the intrusion: 
The persons whose packages are inspected generally fall within a morally 
neutral class. Because everyone carrying the enumerated parcels is required 
to have them inspected, the inspection is not accusative in nature and the 
degree of insult to the entrant's dignity is minimal. Thus, it canitot be said 
that a finger of suspicion is unfairly or arbitrarily being pointed at an indi­
vidual as falling within a "highly selective or suspect" group. 
Id. 
85. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (five percent 
danger of weapons justified a frisk); People v. Dooley, 64 Cal. App. 3d 502, 512, 134 
Cal. Rptr. 573, 579 (1976) ("probability of the reported bomb ... was but lout of 
150, or 1,500, or whatever figure, the odds might nevertheless reasonably ..." justify 
the frisk~). 
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same analysis appears applicable to the nuclear facility searches. 
The pat-down body search, called a "frisk," is a significant in­
trusion upon an individual's privacy. The United States Supreme 
Court rejected the claim that a frisk is only a "petty indignity" for 
in a proper frisk, the "officer must feel with sensitive fingers every 
portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of 
the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin area 
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the 
feet. "86 The airport frisk has been held to be "less noxious than a 
frisk on the street,"87 due to the fact that airport frisks frequently 
occur. The intrusion "is lessened by being one of the crowd. "88 
The courts have made clear that "[t]he frisk ... is to be used 
only in the last instance. "89 The inspection must first "exhaust the 
other efficient and available means, if any, ... before utilizing the 
frisk. "90 The scope of the frisk and inspection is also limited by the 
consideration of reasonableness. The search is reasonable only if it 
is limited to those places "which may reasonably be deemed to 
conceal a weapon or explosive. Reasonableness, in this context, is a 
matter of the probabilities. "91 The appropriate procedures, as sug­
gested by the courts, include repeating a magnetometer search 
after the subject has removed what he believes to have set off the 
alarm. If repetition does not correct the detector's warning, it will 
provide the reasonable suspicion to search more closely. The court 
would probably not allow pat-down searches to be a normal pre­
requisite to entry into a nuclear facility unless it can be clearly 
shown that no other means exist to allow adequate access controls. 
If they are used, the entrant should be allowed to remove what­
ever objects he or she believes are setting off a detection device 
and try to pass through again. Current case law accommodating air­
port passenger screening indicates that if the pat-down search is 
conducted only after all available mechanical detection equipment 
has continued to indicate the presence of contraband, it will most 
86. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17, n.13 (1968) (citing Priar & Martin, Searching 
and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954»; United States v. Alba­
rado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 (2d Cir. 1974). 
87. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 (2d Cir. 1974). 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 809. 
90. [d. at 808. 
91. [d. at 810 (the examination of a small parcel wrapped in aluminum foil vio­
lated the legitimate scope of an airport search); United States v. Knoll, 481 F.2d 884, 
886 (8th Cir. 1973). 
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likely be held to be valid and reasonable in the nuclear safeguards 
context. 92 
d. Use of Change Rooms 
The NRC guides state: 
Unless exit is into a contiguous material access area, all individu­
als should exit from a material access area, other than a vault, 
only via the change rooms and should be required to deposit all 
work clothing in the inner change room, walk through a passage­
way, and dress in street clothing in the outer change room .... 
A guard or watchman need not be attendant except when per­
sonnel are exiting from the material access area. 93 
This requirement can be categorized as a health measure since 
clothing which has been exposed to nuclear materials may itself be 
hazardous. Furthermore, if a radiation detector signaled that the 
employee was emitting excess radiation on his or her body or 
clothing, it is clearly in the best interest of the employee to find 
the source. 
Civil liberties objections may arise when visual surveillance of 
employees undressing is required. The privacy interest affected de­
pends on the employee's own expectation of privacy.94 If surveil­
lance activities in change rooms were conducted openly, there 
would be little reason for an individual to expect privacy. Even 
92. Procedures have been designed which will take these considerations into 
account: 
Upon annuciation of an alarm from explosive or weapon detection equip­
ment located at a protected area access point attended by a lone guard or 
watchman, a guard should be dispatched immediately to the access point 
originating the alarm. If the access point is unattended, two guards should 
be sent to the access point. At the access point the guard or watchman 
should request that the individual's pockets be emptied and that the individ­
ual pass again through the detection equipment. If the individual complies 
and the alarms do not register, the individual may be allowed to pass into 
the protected area after the contents of the individual's pockets have been 
examined verifying that no attempt has been made to pass explosives or fire­
arms into the protected area. If, however, an alarm continues to register, the 
indiVidual should be physically searched by an unarmed security individual, 
while at least one guard or armed patrol watchman observes, to verify that 
no firearms or explosives are yet concealed by the individual. If the individ- . 
ual refuses to comply with the request for further searching, or if a weapon 
or explosives are found, the individual should be denied access. 
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY GUIDES 5.7D-5a 
(1973). 
93. [d. at 5.7D-2a. 
94. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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when open and announced surveillance is taking place, however, 
NRC must still demonstrate that the surveillance is absolutely nec­
essary and not merely auxiliary. 
The constant thread running through the NRC guides is 
the requirement that no individual be left alone or unobserved 
while in a material access area. 95 The obtrusiveness of constant sur­
veillance must be balanced against the need to insure safety and 
the danger from non-observation. The use of change and observa­
tion rooms must be made coextensive with this need. Prior warn­
ing should be given and the surveillance should be made as imper­
sonal as possible. The use of change rooms must be required of all 
personnel entering or leaving a controlled area to avoid arbitrary 
imposition. If surveillance is used in the change room, separate 
rooms should be provided for men and women with observers be­
ing of the same sex as those observed. The use of change and ob­
servation rooms, so long as their obtrusiveness is minimized, would 
seem justified when balanced against the responsibility of the nu­
clear industry for the safety and welfare of its employees and the 
public. 
2. Response to Emergency 
The NRC guides stipulate simply, in the event of an emer­
gency, "[A]ll individuals should be searched for concealed SNM 
before being released from the protected area or collection area. "96 
No stance is taken by NRC concerning the scope of the search. A 
search could involve use of a mechanical detector and perhaps a 
strip search and body cavity examination. Nowhere in the regula­
tions or guides is interrogation mentioned as a response to a short­
age or theft. Substantial pressure for detention, search, and inter­
rogation of employees would certainly result if a successful theft 
occurred. 
a. Search and Seizure 
Although the parameters of the inspection zone are expanded 
in an emergency situation, the administrative character of the 
search remains. The primary goal is to secure the material and pro­
tect the public, rather than capture the criminals. 97 The statutory 
95. See UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY 
GUIDE 5.7 (1973). 
96. Id. at 5.7D-6a. 
97. This is analogous to the Biswell ruling, where the administrative nature of 
the search was upheld even though the individual found to have violated the regula­
tion had committed a criminal act. U.S. v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Clearly there 
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authorization to search continues; the urgency of the situation pro­
vides the exigent circumstances necessary for a warrantless search. 
The searches are "reasonable" administrative searches because the 
interest in containing the potentially dangerous material far out­
weighs the minor intrusion of a blanket search with a mechanical 
detector. 
The expanded procedures for searches in an emergency situa­
tion are defensible on the same grounds as searches in a normal 
situation. It is reasonable to increase the scope of the intrusion to a 
larger area and a greater number of individuals since the counter­
vailing public danger is imminent. 
b. Arrest and Detention 
In an emergency, two concerns arise with respect to employ­
ees. One is that an employee's health may be jeopardized; the 
other is that an employee may be the perpetrator of an SNM theft 
or sabotage. 98 Arrest and detention powers have been upheld 
when the arrest and detention are performed "to further the social 
interest in public health .... "99 As one author notes, "That power 
must, of necessity, include the power to detain and confine persons 
suspected of having contracted or been exposed to an infectious 
disease; without need to resort to judicial proceedings. "100 
A worker who is carrying even a minute amount of plutonium 
represents a substantial health hazard not only to himself or her­
self, but also to others who share any space with him or her. There 
is a great similarity between toxicity and disease in this context. If 
detention or arrest is pursuant to the possibility of unintentional 
transport of SNM by an individual or group, then current case law.>.", 
upholding quarantines as a health measure may be applicable. 
If arrest or detention results from suspicion that the individual 
has stolen the nuclear material, the fourth and fifth amendment re­
quirements incident to criminal arrest must be observed since the 
is greater concern to insure safety than to arrest criminals, but this can be said for 
most crimes. 
98. Portal monitors at exits to nuclear material access areas were first used to 
protect the employees' health. Safeguards concern developed subsequent to this. 
This progression is important in that health inspections are not aimed at finding pos­
sible criminal activities, whereas conducting exactly the same search for stolen SNM 
is quasi-criminal. In absence of intent to uncover criminal activity, an administrative 
search is not likely to be looked upon negatively by the courts. 
99. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGULATORY GUIDE 
5.7 (1973). 
100. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 78 (1976). 
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detention is in relation to suspected criminal activity. It has been 
held that statements obtained during the "custodial interrogation" 
of a criminal defendant are inadmissible unless certain procedural 
safeguards are employed to insure the individual's privilege against 
self-incrimination. 101 The critical issue is whether an interrogation 
at a nuclear facility is a "custodial interrogation" within the mean­
ing of Miranda v. Arizona. 102 The United States Supreme Court 
has stated that "the Miranda ... warnings were required when the 
person being interrogated was 'in custody ... or otherwise de­
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' "103 It is not 
clear whether the courts would find a safeguards-related interroga­
tion to be a "custodial interrogation." Since the employee would 
not be free to leave the facility on his or her own volition, the 
Miranda safeguards might be applicable. If the Miranda require­
ments are ignored, conviction in a subsequent criminal proceeding 
would be jeopardized. It should be remembered, however, that re­
covery of the missing SNM, rather than criminal conviction, is the 
prime objective here. The interrogators would clearly be under 
pressure to ignore Miranda requirements in order to more effi­
cient1y locate the stolen material. 
IV. RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
In the event of a successful theft of SNM, strategies may be 
implemented to recover quickly the stolen material before it can 
be used destructively or become a health hazard. The Department 
of Energy has devised specific plans to locate and recover lost or 
stolen radioactive materials, but because this information is confi­
dential, it cannot be referred to in this article. Nevertheless,. there 
are practical and legal reasons for undertaking a comprehensive ex­
amination of possible recovery operations. 104 
Recovery measures could include area-wide and perimeter 
searches, electronic surveillance of suspected terrorists, detention 
and interrogation with or without counsel, traffic and population 
control, silencing news coverage, and imposition of martial law. 
Implementation of these recovery procedures would clearly entail 
suppression of civil liberties. 
Recovery activities pose perhaps the most serious civil 
10L Miranda v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 436 (1966). 
102. ld. 
103. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969). 
104. M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS 
152-53 (1974). 
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liberties threats of all nuclear safeguards. The catastrophic threats 
posed by a clandestinely developed nuclear device mandate that 
law enforcement agencies undertake the most effective and expedi­
ent means available to recover stolen SNM. An efficient recovery 
operation is crucial to minimizing the catastrophe arising from an 
unauthorized diversion of SNM. Potential thieves might be dis­
suaded if it were common knowledge that the government had pre­
pared effective recovery procedures. 
The FBI investigates all incidents, including nuclear threats, 
which involve suspected or actual violations of federal laws. That 
agency would be primarily responsible for directing and co­
ordinating the federal government's recovery efforts. To aid the 
FBI, the Department of Energy could locate and identify radiation­
producing materials. 
;;
'.' 
A. 	 Legal Authority 
Recovery operations would undoubtedly be perceived by the 
public and the courts as essential to preserving society's welfare, 
even though suppression of some constitutional rights would inevi­
tably occur. The government could rely on several legal doctrines 
to justify the intrusions. Recovery operation activities could be 
based on the necessity to uphold national security, to undertake a 
criminal investigation, or to act with expedience to an emergency 
situation that poses imminent danger to the general welfare. Judi­
cial acceptance of recovery operation procedures will depend upon 
the government's ability to justify its actions under one of these le­
gal theories. 
Serious national security problems would arise if a foreign na­
tion attempted to subvert our government through a diversion of 
SNM. If SNM was stolen by a foreign agent or a person collab­
orating with a foreign power, the usual requirement of obtaining a 
warrant prior to the search might be eliminated. lOS 
Recovery operations might also be justified as an ordinary 
criminal investigation. Under this rationale, the United States Su­
preme Court has established constitutional guidelines for con­
ducting searches during a criminal investigation that would apply 
to searches for SNM. The fourth amendment requires that all crim­
inal searches be reasonable. The purpose of a search must always 
be balanced against the invasion which it entails. Officials might be 
required to show that other recovery techniques could not achieve 
105. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 618-23 (D.C, Cir. 1975), 
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equally acceptable results. The reasonableness of a search will de­
pend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 
The fourth amendment also requires that a search warrant de­
scribe with particularity the place to be searched and the persons 
or things to be seized. lOS The Supreme Court has held that a war­
rant must be particular enough to allow the officer, "with reason­
able effort to ascertain and identifY the place intended. "107 The 
Court, however, would probably not allow the particularity re­
quirement to preclude a reasonable search for stolen SNM. Some 
commentators have concluded that the Court would be willing to 
sacrifice the particularity requirement, to a degree, to maintain ju­
dicial control over the search.108 It might easily justifY a relaxation 
of the particularity requirement on the grave dangers that would 
result if SNM were used destructively. 109 
B. Elements of Recovery of SNM 
The procedures used in searching for stolen SNM necessarily 
entail civil liberty intrusions. Persons may be detained by officers, 
interrogated, frisked, or have their homes or vehicles searched. Of­
ficers might also use electronic surveillance without informing the 
person being investigated. 
Recovery activities can be broken down into three broad cate­
gories. First, there are activities designed to secure stolen materi­
als. These involve area and perimeter searches of pedestrians and 
vehicles. Next, there are steps taken to identifY perpetrators. 
These include detention and interrogation, with and without coun­
sel, and electronic and physical surveillance of suspected terrorists. 
Finally, there are activities meant to protect the public against ex­
plosion or radioactivity. These encompass forced evacuations, traffic 
and population control, and possible press censorship to mitigate 
panic. Individual attention to each of these recovery activities pro­
vides insight to the extent of potential intrusions. 
106. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
107. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). See also Comment, su­
pra note 22, at 418. 
108. See Comment, supra note 22, at 420. 
109. For instance, the Supreme Court has made it clear that domestic security 
surveillance programs were overbroad relative to the dangers they sought to avert. 
This attitude may not extend to clear cut cases of extreme emergency. United States 
v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,323-24 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
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1. Activities to Secure Stolen SNM 
a. Area Searches 
In the absence of new legislation or rulemaking specifically ad­
dressing recovery operation activities, the judiciary is likely to re­
spond to area search techniques in one of several ways. A court 
could declare the search unconstitutional and attempt to define 
certain circumstances or statutes which might make the recovery 
search acceptable; it could expand the emergency exception to allow 
for warrantless searches in emergency situations involying the risk 
of a nuclear incident; or it could relax both the probable cause and 
particularity requirement for issuance of a search warrant. 
The implications of these options are far-reaching. If the emer­
gency exception was expanded, warrantless searches might later be 
justified on this expanded rationale in other emergency situations 
potentially less dangerous than a nuclear safeguards breach. If par­
ticularity and probable cause requirements for search warrants 
were relaxed, a constitutional requirement explicitly condemning 
such general searches would be directly contravened. Either option 
requires a fundamental change in the law of search and seizure and 
directly impairs civil liberties interests. The extreme urgency of a 
recovery operation, coupled with the complete lack of precedent 
for such actions, makes the area search an activity which is wholly 
unpredictable in impact. The impact of an area search could be 
lessened if NRC established rules for treating evidence recovered 
and specifically designated a government official to be in control. 
b. Perimeter Searches of Pedestrians and Vehicles 
Authorities might feel compelled to search pedestrians and ve­
hicles entering or leaving areas where they suspect stolen SNM is 
located in order to isolate the material. Portable mechanical detect­
ors, similar to the magnetometers used to search persons at air­
ports, could be used for routine searches with a minimal amount of 
intrusion. If time precluded obtaining these mechanical detection 
devices during an emergency, officials might be required to resort 
to hand searches of individuals and vehicles. The extraordinary 
"need to search" for stolen SNM would presumably justify physical 
searches of all nearby pedestrians. Clearly, courts would oppose 
searches that were conducted arbitrarily and without uniformity, or 
not confined to the object sought. The situations which permit 
warrantless searches could easily be expanded to include SNM re­
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covery because the emergency nature of the situation might realis­
tically preclude issuance of a warrant. 
A warrantless vehicle search might also be lawfully extended 
to nuclear recovery activity under current case law and statutes. It 
is often impractical to secure a warrant because of the mobile na­
ture of a vehicle.1l0 The existing exception to the warrant require­
ment for automobile searches would clearly apply here and might 
be further broadened by relaxing the probable cause requirement. 
These changes would not be overly intrusive since the civil liberty 
implications of a vehicle search are slight, and the general welfare 
implications of a successful recovery operation are great. 
2. Activities to Identify Perpetrators 
If SNM were diverted or stolen, great pressure would exist to 
detain and interrogate all persons suspected of having knowledge of 
the location of the materials or the perpetrators of the theft. De­
tention and interrogation on less than probable cause has been rec­
ognized by Congress and the judiciary. It is not clear whether a 
nuclear safeguards breach would justify creating an exception. Law 
enforcement officials, under severe pressure to recover the missing 
SNM, might be forced to resort to custodial interrogations regard­
less of constitutional limitations. The best alternative would be for 
courts to allow detention and custodial interrogation of persons sus­
pected of having inside knowledge of nuclear incidents. The threat 
of a nuclear catastrophe would justify the civil liberties intrusions. 
3. Activities to Protect the Public 
a. Generally 
The agency conducting the recovery operation of stolen SNM 
would need broad powers to control citizens who might obstruct 
the recovery. The agency might want to discourage and punish any­
one who interfered with its operations, to evacuate areas where 
the health hazard was great, and to deal with individuals who 
might commit other crimes while disorder prevailed. 
Measures employed to recover stolen SNM would vary accord­
ing to the perceived severity of the threat. If the threat appeared 
to be limited, such as theft of less than one kilogram of ura­
nium-235, the recovery operation would include only ordinary in­
vestigative techniques. If, however, greater quantities were in­
110. Carroll Y. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
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volved, the recovery operation might-- include imposition of martial 
law and a general suspension of constitutional rights. The President 
could· also summon federal troops to control the population during 
a recovery operations. 111 Curfews might have to be imposed. Cur­
fews have been successfully used in urban riot situatioU:s to thin 
traffic and reduce ordinary crime. 112 
b. Press Censorship 
The analysis thus far has specifically addressed legal questions 
concerning the mechanics of the recovery operation. Anotherperti­
nent legal concern is whether news organizations could be required 
by the government not to publicize the recovery operation. A de­
sire for the free flow of information militates in favor of publicizing 
the recovery operation. If, however, information provided to the 
public was misleading or sensationalized, widespread panic could 
result. General panic might be avoided if the recovery operation 
was kept secret. An unpublicized recovery operation might frus­
trate terrorists who steal SNM to gain access to the public eye. 
Civil liberties would be severely affected if the government forced 
news organizations to suppress information prior to publication. 
111. The Constitution provides that the President insure that the laws are faith­
fully executed. u.s. CONST. art. 2, § 2. The federal government is obliged to guaran­
tee a republican form of government to the states and protect them from invasion. Id. 
art. 4, § 4. Congress has the power to call out the militia to execute federal laws, sup­
press insurrections, and repel invasions. Id. art. 1, § 8. 
The President by statute has the power to suppress insurrections against state 
governments upon request of the state governor or legislature. 10 U.S.C. § 331 
(1976). However, the term "insurrection" has been narrowly construed as a threat to 
the existence of the government. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974). The President could also rely upon statute giv­
ing him power to use federal troops to enforce federal laws whenever "unlawful ob­
structions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellions against the authority of the 
United States makes it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any 
State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings...." 10 U.S.C. § 
332 (1976). Courts have also been reluctant to disturb decisions to use federal troops 
during times of great domestic violence. See Note, Riot Control and the Use of Fed­
eral Troops, 81 HARV. L. REv. 638 (1968); Engdahl, Soldiers Riots and Revolutions: 
The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1 
(1971). Federal soldiers employed in a recovery operation would be enforcing fed­
eral law and should be given status as a law enforcement officer. See Murray, Civil 
Disturbance, Justifiable Homicide and Military Law, 54 MIL. L. REV. 129, 144-45 
(1971). 
112. Comment, Developments in the Law: The National Security Interest and 
Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1304-07 (1971); Comment, The Riot Curfew, 
57 CAL. L. REV. 450 (1969). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to identify some of the potential 
civil liberty costs associated with the nuclear energy alternative. 
From the preceeding discussion, it should be apparent that imple­
mentation of a comprehensive nuclear safeguard strategy will di­
rectly conflict with many constitutionally protected rights. Never­
theless, increased public and industry awareness of the tremendous 
risks involved will inevitably demand that such a strategy be em­
ployed. It is, therefore, essential that a well-reasoned strategy be 
developed to effectively accomplish safeguard objectives and, at the 
same time, minimize adverse societal impacts . 
. The NRC should provide specific guidance to the nuclear in­
dustry on particular safeguard techniques. A regulatory guide 
should be developed for licensees to follow in the event of a short­
age or loss of SNM at a nuclear facility .. This guide should specify 
acceptable procedures to be used in the search, detention, and in­
terrogation of persons in the area. 113 It is essential that the meth­
ods used in such activities be debated and agreed upon before ac­
tual implementation is needed. Since nuclear safeguards are a 
matter of federal law and are of national concern, these decisions 
should not be left to the local industry. Similar guidance is neces­
sary regarding preemployment screening procedures. NRC should 
sanction specific methods of information gathering and specifically 
direct how the information obtained shall be interpreted and used 
in a security determination. 114 Again, in the interests of uniformity 
and efficiency, it is necessary that these issues be debated and re­
solved prospectively. 
113. The guide might provide that when detention and/or interrogation occurs, 
the individual being detained should be informed of his Miranda rights. The infor­
mation turned over during such an interrogation mayor may not be given on the ba­
sis of immunity from criminal prosecution. Immunity could be debated, at least ini­
tially, by NRC in developing the guide. The guide might further provide that prior 
notice be given to all employees that detention and/or interrogation may follow a 
shortage, loss or sabotage attempt. In addition, it would be efficacious to have an at­
torney or legal representative present at all interrogations to make clear on the re­
cord that NRC has considered and accepted a particular legal posture (i.e., custodial 
or non-custodial) which has been adhered to during the interrogation. 
114. It is recommended that for the material access screening program cur­
rently under consideration by the NRC, protected information be made inadmissible 
as evidence in a screening determination. This could be stated briefly in the purpose 
and scope section of the proposed Part II of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regula­
tions. NRC gives nothing up in doing this because the Privacy Act precludes the dis­
semination or retention of such information in any event. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). 
Such a statement would narrow the scope of judicial review, if litigation occurs. 
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The organization and implementation of an effective recovery 
operation also demands advance consideration by the NRC. Pres­
ently, it is unclear which government agency would have con­
trolling authority and ultimate responsibility in a recovery opera­
tion. The NRC and the FBI should negotiate a memorandum of 
understanding concerning the relationship, authority, and responsi­
bilities of each during a recovery operation. Such advance consid­
eration would mitigate confusion and panic if a substantial nuclear 
theft occurred. 115 
Advance legislative initiative could also resolve the open­
ended conjecture which surrounds the implications of a nuclear 
safeguard breach. It would be both feasible and prudent for Con­
gress to enact an emergency statute to cover any nuclear safe­
guard breach which substantially endangers the public. 116 The stat­
ute could delegate emergency authority to a particular executive 
officer such as the United States Attorney General or the Presi­
dent. 117 It could specify standards for proper investigatory proce­
dures118 which are designed to minimize personal intrusions. 119 
NRC has been designated by Congress as the expert body 
which makes determinations concerning nuclear safeguards. The 
enabling legislation grants NRC broad discretion to promulgate 
115. It might be well for NRC to adopt the position that where the techniques 
of ordinary law enforcement can be used in performing recovery operation investiga­
tions, they should be used preferentially over national security authority. Authority 
to invoke national security powers should not come from NRC unless it is the result 
of a determination by a joint NRC/FBI committee. Relying on national security only 
when no other legal rationale will adequately address a situation, would be totally 
consistent with NRC's duty to minimize the societal impacts of nuclear energy. 
116. Congressional willingness to adopt the Price-Anderson Act protecting the 
economic interests of the nuclear energy industry and its insurers in the event of an 
emergency indicates congressional willingness to enact legislation designed to deal 
with the special problems posed by nuclear power. Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 
85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957). 
117. This same officer could also be given responsibility for the release of all 
news information concerning the emergency. See note 116 supra. 
118. To facilitate a recovery operation search the statute might specify an in­
vestigatory standard to be the function equivalent of probable cause. This standard 
might be an articulated and reasonable belief that the contraband SNM is contained 
in a specific area. See notes 116-117 supra. 
119. Instructions should be included that, when possible, a perimeter search 
and area quarantine should be initiated to allow time for effective and less intrusive 
mechanical search of the area suspected of containing contraband SNM. When possi­
ble, individuals desiring to leave the area should be given the option to remain in 
the suspect area until a mechanical body search is possible. Further difficulties 
could be avoided by providing that any contraband found during a recovery opera­
tion which is not related to the purpose of the search could be confiscated, but 
would not be admissable as evidence in criminal prosecutions. 
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regulations. 12o Its decisions, however, must be well-reasoned and 
based on a substantial record, or they may be overturned on judi­
cial review. 121 NRC can minimize the potential for negative judi­
cial review by holding open, formal hearings to solicit public input 
and by maintaining an adequate record to justify its rulemaking de­
cisions. Although NRC is empowered to make the initial decisions 
in this area, the courts will determine the ultimate validity of regu­
lations that affect civil liberty interests. NRC should undertake an 
honest and vigorous campaign to formulate a nuclear safeguard 
strategy. It must openly debate all relevant arguments prior to 
rulemaking so that the validity of its decisions can be effectively 
evaluated on the record as a whole. It should actively seek input 
from all interested parties and welcome judicial review of its re­
sulting decisions. It is only through the interplay of open adminis­
trative decisionmaking and effective judicial review that a safe and 
efficient nuclear safeguard strategy can be developed. 
Many of the factors pushing the United States toward in­
creased domestic security measures are independent of the nuclear 
energy controversy. The issues raised by nuclear safeguards are 
just some of the many novel problems resulting from rapid, ad­
vanced technological development. Current United States nuclear 
policy has primarily focused on the threat of worldwide nuclear 
weapons proliferation rather than the safeguarding of nuclear 
generating facilities. The recent near-disaster at the Three-Mile Is­
land Nuclear Facility in Pennsylvania, however, has shocked the 
public into awareness of the threats posed by even the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy.122 Undoubtedly, the government will be in­
creasingly pressured to effectively and safely regulate the civilian 
nuclear power industry. One can only hope that rationality will 
prevail in the ensuing debate about whether individual constitu­
tional rights should be maintained in the face of increasing 
technological impediments. 
120. See notes 11-12 supra. 
121. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). 
122. See, e.g., Now Comes the Fallout: Back from the Brink; aftermath of the 
Three Mile Island Incident, TIME, April 16, 1979, at 22; Now for Operation Teaket­
tle; Cooldown at Three Mile Island, TIME, April 30, 1979, at 60; Nuclear Tapes: 
Transcripts of NRC Emergency Meeting concerning Three Mile Island Accident, 
NEWSWEEK, April 23, 1979, at 30. 
